Concentration, Separation, and Dispersion: Economic Geography and the Environment by Michael Rauscher
 
 
Thünen-Series of Applied Economic Theory 
Thünen-Reihe Angewandter Volkswirtschaftstheorie 
 
 
Working Paper No. 109 
 
 
Concentration, Separation, and Dispersion: 








Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät 
Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre 




Concentration, Separation, and Dispersion:  




Universität Rostock, ifo-Institut München 
 
Abstract 
The paper investigates the spatial patterns of industrial location and 
environmental pollution in a new-economic-geography model. Factors 
of production and their owners are mobile, but factor owners are not 
required to  live  in  the  region  in  which  their  factors  are  employed. 
Under  laisser  faire,  a  chase-and-flee  cycle  of  location  is  possible: 
people,  who  prefer  a  clean  environment,  are  chased  by  polluting 
industries, which want to locate geographically close to the market. 
Locational  patterns  under  optimal  environmental  regulation  include 
concentration,  separation,  dispersion  and  several  intermediate 
patterns.  Moreover,  it  is  shown  that  marginal  changes  in  environ-
mental policy may induce discrete changes in locational patterns. 
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Economic  geography deals with the allocation of economic activity in  geographical space. 
With his short monograph "Geography and Trade", Paul Krugman [12] revived the interest in 
this field of economic research, which had been largely neglected for a long time. Using tools 
of modern trade theory, in particular Krugman's [10, 11] intra-industry trade models based on 
Dixit-Stiglitz  [4]  monopolistic  competition,  a  "new  economic  geography"  (NEG)  was 
established. The NEG is a theory that does not rely on ad-hoc arguments and heuristics to ex-
plain spatial patterns of economic activity but instead builds on a consistent micro-founded 
modelling  framework.  General  features  of  the  NEG  are  the  interaction  of  centripetal  and 
centrifugal forces (which explain agglomeration and spatial dispersion of economic activities, 
respectively),  bifurcations,  and  path  dependencies.  Small  parameter  changes  may  drive  an 
economy from agglomeration to dispersion and vice versa and adjustment paths towards long-
term equlibria are not unique such that the outcomes of dynamic allocation processes in space 
are indeterminate and may depend on historical pre-conditions or self-fulfilling expectations. 
The state of the art is summarized in books and survey papers such as Fujita et al., [6] Neary 
[15], Baldwin et al. [2], and Brakman et al. [3]. 
Geographical space is an important category in environmental economics, too. With the 
exception of greenhouse gases, CFCs, and possibly some other global pollutants, emissions 
generate more environmental harm in the geographical proximity of their source than far away. 
Catastrophic events like the London smog disaster of 1953 and the accidents in Seveso (1976), 
Bhopal  (1984),  and  Chernobyl  (1986)  tragically  testify  this  relationship.  Nevertheless,  the 
environmental-economics literature on the geographical dimension of pollution and, in part-
icular its interaction with the spatial patterns of economic activity is still rather small. An early 
paper is Siebert's [22] handbook article, which was written before the arrival of the NEG and is 
by and large based on traditional models of foreign trade. Markusen et al. [14], Rauscher [18], 
and Hoel [8] look at interjurisdictional competition for mobile polluting firms and find that, 
depending on the severity of environmental harm, the outcome of this competition is either a 
"race to the bottom" or "not in my backyard". Similar results are obtained by Pflüger [16], who  
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looks at the issue in a trade model incorporating Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition and 
"iceberg" transportation costs. Although the model contains the main building blocks of NEG 
theory, it is still a trade model in that factors of production are immobile and agglomeration is 
excluded. Kanbur et al. [9] look at interjurisdictional competition, too. Modelling space as a 
continuous variable, they find that small jurisdictions have incentives to charge lower environ-
mental taxes than larger ones. Agglomeration, which is the central issue of the NEG, is not 
addressed in any of these papers. Papers explicitly addressing issues of economic geography 
are  Rauscher [19],  van  Marrewijk  [23],  and  Lange/Quaas  [13].  Rauscher [19]  looked at  a 
variety of NEG models and derived optimal environmental policies only for a world in which 
factors are immobile whereas residents can change their locations. The genuine NEG issues 
that arise from the mobility of factors were, however, only sketched in this paper. Elbers/Wit-
hagen [5] and van Marrewijk [23] investigate core-periphery NEG models in which centrifugal 
and centripetal forces do exist and derive the result that agglomeration forces are mitigated by 
environmental externalities. Similar results are reported by Lange/Quaas [13] who derive a 
wide  range  of  economic-geography  patterns  including  full  agglomeration,  partial  agglom-
eration, and dispersion of economic activities. The underlying reason for less agglomeration is 
the  centrifugal  character  of  environmental  pollution.  Workers  demand  compensating  wage 
differentials if a job requires them to live in a polluted industrial agglomeration. This centri-
fugal force mitigates or even offsets the agglomerative forces that are present in NEG models 
Similar issues are discussed in the present paper. As expected environmental pollution con-
stitutes a centrifugal force that works against agglomeration in this paper, too. However, the 
following analysis differs from the aforementioned papers in one important aspect. I assume 
that people can escape pollution. They are not tied to the region in which their income is 
generated.  This  generates  some  additional  patterns  of  geographical  organization  of  the 
economy that have not been addressed in the previous literature.  
To start off, I define three stylized patters which are rarely observed in their purest form bat 
that are useful as benchmark scenarios in a theoretical analysis,  
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•  concentration, i.e. a geographical pattern where the most populated regions are the most 
polluted ones, e.g. big cities like Shanghai, Mexico City, or Los Angeles, 
•  the separation of pollution and population, the example being nuclear power stations, which 
are often located in peripheral regions with low population densities, and 
•  dispersion, i.e. a pattern where people and pollution are (more or less) evenly distributed in 
space. 
To address these issues, I use an economic-geography model based on the standard ingredients, 
i.e. Dixit-Stiglitz [4] preferences and "iceberg" transportation costs. Moreover, like in many 
other NEG models, regions are symmetric. The main difference compared the standard core-
periphery model of the NEG literature, which was extented by Elbers/Withagen [5] and others 
to deal with environmental externalities, is that factor owners do not have to live where their 
factors are employed. This is related to the footloose-capital model used by Pflüger [17], where 
the factor is mobile whereas its owners are not. As already mentioned, I go one step further by 
assuming that factor owners are mobile as well, but that they can choose their location of 
residence independently of that of their factor. With this assumption, two new patterns that 
cannot  occur  in  other  NEG  models  are  detected.  The  first  one  is  the  "chase-and-flee" 
phenomenon: residents try to avoid pollution and leave agglomerations, but the industry wants 
to be where the market is and follows the consumers. The second one is separation: residents 
and the industry agglomerate in different regions if environmental damage is large. 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the model. Section 3 is devoted 
to the analysis of the spatial patterns of economic activities and pollution under laisser faire. In 
Section 4, I look at welfare maximization and derive optimal allocations of production and 
consumption  in  geographical  space.  In  Section  5,  the  choice  of  environmental-policy 





2 The Model 
Assume a world consisting of two regions, East and West. Both regions are identical as regards 
preferences and technology. All variables related to the West are indicated by asterisks. To 
save space, the following paragraphs will perform the steps to derive the market equilibrium 
only for one region, the East. As regions are symmetric, the same steps can be performed for 
the West and the results are analogous.  
Households 
The total population of the two regions is 1, of which ß live in the East and (1-ß) in the West. 
All households are identical. There is a single factor of production which is equally distributed 
across households. Factor supply is inelastic and equals 1, of which a share k is employed in 
the East and (1–k) in the West. ß and k are endogenous variables in this model: households and 
factors are mobile but people do not have to live where their factor is employed. Think of 
mobile capitalists who, for example, prefer to live in pleasant environments such as the Cote 
d'Azur or the Swiss canton of Ticino whereas their capital is employed in an export processing 
zone in China. With factor prices w and w*, the factor income of a representative household is 
kw+(1–k)w*. Moreover, each household inelastically supplies one unit of a numéraire good 
such that its budget is 1+ kw+(1–k)w*. Let x be the consumption of the numéraire good. The 
other good is a differentiated  good and it is  available in  many  different varieties. Product 
variety is modelled as a continuum. c(i) and c*(j) denote consumption of domestic varieties in 
the East and in the West, m(j) and m*(i) denote the imports of foreign varieties, and θ > 1 is the 
"horses fed with grain"
1 transportation cost mark-up. p(i) and p*(j) are the prices of Eastern 
                                                 
1   In his seminal work on the "isolated state", von Thünen [24 , p. 16] made the assumption that the 
horses pulling the carts of grain from the rural region to the city are fed with grain from the carts. 
Thus, the transportation cost is proportional to the value of the commodity transported. Some 100 
years later, this concept was introduced into Heckscher-Ohlin trade theory by Samuelson [21] and 
termed "melting-iceberg" transportation cost. The advantages of the approach are (i) that a trans-
portation sector does not need to be modelled and that (ii) that price elasticities of demand are not 
affected by the introduction of transportation costs.  
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and Western goods, respectively, and n and n* measure product variety. Thus, the Eastern 
households' budget constraint is  
    ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) * w k kw x dj j m j * p di i c i p
* n n
− + + = + +∫ ∫ 1 1
0 0 θ .     (1) 
  Preferences are of the love-of-variety type à la Dixit/Stiglitz [4]. Utility from consumption 
is quasilinear and it is augmented by subtracting the disutility from environmental pollution.
2 
Thus, the utility of a representative resident is  
    ( ) ( )
z
e

















γ γ ,        (2) 
) 1 , 0 ( ∈ γ  is a measure of substitutability. The elasticity of substitution between different varieties 
is σ=(1−γ)
−1. Quasilinearity implies that all income effects are captured by the numéraire good. 
Finally, e denotes emissions (e* being the Western equivalent of e) and we assume that there 
are no transboundary pollution spillovers. δ  measures the impact or intensity of environmental 
pollution.  Moreover,  the  environmental  damage  is  increasing  and  convex,  the  curvature 
parameter, z, being positive. The reason for specifying the damage function in this way is that 
some  results  to  be  derived  in  this  paper  depend  on  the  curvature  of  the  marginal-damage 
function. In this respect, the present model differs from the standard environmental-economics 
model,  where  assumptions  are  made  only  on  the  slope,  but  not  on  the  curvature  of  the 
marginal-damage function. If z=1, the marginal damage is linear in emissions, for z<1 it is 
concave, for z>1 it is convex.  
  Utility  maximization  results  in  inverse  demand  functions  for  Eastern  and  Western 
commodities  
    ) , 0 ( for                              ) ( ) (
1 n i i c i p ∈ =
− γ ,        (3) 
    *) , 0 ( for                                 ) ( ) ( *
1 1 n j j m j p ∈ =
− − γ θ         (3*) 
                                                 
2   This  quasilinear  utility  function  is  probably  the  simplest  way  of  specifying  the  love-of-variety 
model. It is even simpler than the model suggested by Pflüger [17], who also uses a quasilinear spec-
ification. The disadvantage of quasilinear utility is that model is only a partial-equlibrium model in 
that it neglects interactions between the market for differentiated goods and other goods markets.   
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Compared to many other economic-geography models, the demand functions are very simple 
(e.g., see Baldwin et al. [2]; Fujita et al. [6] and Neary [15]). They do not contain a CES price 
index. This is a direct result from specifying the utility function (2) as quasi-linear.  
  Moreover, it is assumed that all varieties are produced with the same technologies and the 
same factor requirements. Then the prices for these varieties are identical and the arguments i 
can be dropped. Using (1), (3), and (3*) in (2) gives the utility function of an individual living 
in the East:   
    ( ) ( )
z
e






























.     (4) 
The producers 
The supply side of the market for the non-numéraire good is characterized by Dixit-Stiglitz 
monopolistic competition. There is only one factor of production and its remuneration, which 
is exogenous to the firm, is w. All producers use the same technology characterized by in-
creasing returns to scale. In particular, I assume constant marginal cost vw and fixed cost Fw, F 
and v being technological unit input requirements. Let q denote the output of a representative 
firm. Its profits are   
    ( )w vq F pq + − = π                 (5) 
Profit maximization yields  
    vw p = γ ,                 
i.e. marginal revenue equals marginal cost. To simplify notation, choose units of the input such 
that γ = v. Thus,  
    w = p.                   (6) 
Using this in the zero-profit condition yields: 






q q .                (7)  
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This is a standard result of the Dixit-Stiglitz model with constant marginal cost. The output of 
a single variety is determined by the price elasticity and the parameters of the cost function, but 
it does not depend on any other variables of the model.  
  Since all firms produce identical quantities, the number of firms can be inferred from the 
factor market equilibrium. As k is factor supply in the East and factor demand is n(F+vq), the 
factor-market equilibrium is 
    ( )
F
k
n γ − = 1 .                 (8) 
Using (7) again, we have  
    Q=nq=k.                  (9) 
Emissions and environmental damage 
Emissions are linearly related to production. For simplicity choose units such that the factor of 
proportionality is unity. Thus, e=Q and e*=Q*. From (9), it then follows that  
    e=k.                    (10) 
In the other region, e*=1–k. Thus environmental damages in the East and in the West are 
D=δ k
1+z/(1+z)  and  D*=δ (1–k)
1+z/(1+z),  respectively.  In  the  remainder  of  the  paper,  the 
differential in environmental damage, D – D*, will be of major importance. Its derivative with 
respect to k is  
    ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 1 (
*
> − + =
− z z k k
dk
D D d
δ ,     
which is hump-shaped for z<1, u-shaped for z>1 and horizontal for z=1. It follows that D–D* is 
S shaped for z<1 and inversely S-shaped for z>1. See Figure 1. These curvature properties 
imply that, starting from a symmetric equilibrium, k=0.5, the first unit of factor movement 
causes the largest (smallest) change in the difference in environmental damage across regions 
if z<1 (z>1).   
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D D d * −
δ  0 
 
Figure 1: The differential in environmental damages across regions and its change 
Goods market equilibrium 
In the goods-market equilibrium, supply and demand are equal for each variety, i.e. 
    * ) 1 ( m ß ßc q θ − + = ,               
    * ) 1 ( * c ß m ß q − + = θ ,             
Inserting the Eastern inverse demand function, (3), and its Western analogue, and then using 
(7) to substitute for q and q*, we obtain 
















p ,             (11)  
















p ,            (11*) 
with  1 1 < = − γ
γ




Finally, the indirect utility can now be represented as functions of the exogenous parameters of 
the model and of the patterns of location of factors and factor owners, k and ß, respectively. In 
order to keep things a bit clearer, we do not eliminate prices. Thus, using (6) to substitute for 
w, (8)  to  substitute for n,  and  (9)  to substitute  for  e  in  (4)  yields  the  indirect  utility  of  a 
representative Eastern resident: 
    ( ) ( ) ( )
z
k
* p k kp
F





























.   (12) 
Performing the same steps for the West yields 
    ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
z
k
* p k kp
F































,  (12*) 
with p and p* being determined by (11) and (11*), respectively. 
 
3 Patterns of Location and Agglomeration 
To analyse the spatial allocation of economic activity, we first look at the locations of the 
factors and then at the locations of their owners. Factors move if there is a difference in factor 
remunerations. From w=p, w*=p*, (11) and (11*), we have 



















w w       (13) 
Factors are indifferent where to locate if ß=0.5. In Figure 2.1, this is represented by the vertical 
indifference line at ß=0.5. The horizontal parts of the line are explained by the fact that factor 
shares cannot be larger than 1 or less than 0. In a next step, let us consider the behaviour of the 
factor owners. The difference in utility between East and West is 
    ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
z z k k
z
* p k kp
F
























,  (14)  
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where the last term on the right-hand side is the environmental-damage differential depicted in 
the left-hand part of Figure 1. Assume for a moment that environmental considerations do not 
matter such that this term vanishes, δ=0. Then the  * ~ ~ u u =  line, along which households are 
indifferent where to locate, can be derived from (14) by using (11) and (11*): 
  ( ) ( )












k .          (15) 
Its slope is  
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )









− + + − −













*, u ~ u ~
.     
From (15), we have that k=0.5 for ß=0.5 and that k>0 for ß=0 and k<1 for ß=1. Moreover, 
taking the second derivative, one can establish that the slope is minimized in the symmetric 
equilibrium (ß=k=0.5) and that it increases towards the boundaries of the (0,1) interval. The 
resulting  * ~ ~ u u = line is depicted in 2.1 together with the w=w* line. There are three equilibria: 
full agglomeration in one of the two regions or an equal distribution of population and factors 
across the regions. Let us introduce simple adjustment dynamics, such that factors move to the 
region offering higher wages and people move to the region offering a larger indirect utility 
    ( ) * w w k k − = λ & ,             
    ( ) * ~ ~ u u ß − = β λ & .             
λk  and λß  are positive adjustment-speed parameters. The Jacobian of the linearized dynamic 
system is 
   
( )










































,     (16) 
where the signs of the elements of J are displayed in (16) as well. The adjustment dynamics are 
indicated by horizontal and vertical arrows in Figure 2.1. There are two centripetal forces and 
one centrifugal force in this model. Factor movements always foster agglomeration. Factors 
move to where the  majority of the consumers  live because the  region  with larger demand  
11 
 
generates  higher  facor  remuneration.  In  the  case  of  housholds,  there  are  two  forces,  one 
centripetal, the other centrifugal. Consumers are attracted by producers offering a large degree 
of  product  variety  without  incurring  transportation  costs.  In  this  respect,  they  like 
agglomeration, too. This is what Fujita et al. [6, p. 346] call "thick markets". On the other 
hand, they do not like to live where many other households live because the high demand 
raises local prices. This congestion effect is the centrifugal force of the model. The two centri-
petal forces, however, dominate and the two agglomeration equilibria are stable whereas the 
symmetric dispersion equilibrium is unstable – unless a trajectory starts on the saddle path 
leading to this point. Mathematically, this follows from the fact that the Jacobian, J, has a 
negative determinant. However, as initial conditions are historically given, the probability of 
starting exactly on this saddle is infinitesimally small. Thus, the corresponding equilibrium is 
irrelevant and laisser  faire implies full  agglomeration, i.e. the industry and the households 









* u ~ u ~ =  
 
Figure 2.1: Patterns of location in the absence of environmental concerns 
 
                                                 
3   Note that unlike in other geography models, dispersion is not a stable equilibrium. This means that a 
variant of the black-hole condition discussed in Fujita et al. [6, Ch. 4] is violated here due to the 
quasilinearity of the utility function.  
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Having determined agglomeration patterns in the absence of environmental problems, let us 
now consider environmental pollution. In this case, the second-row, first-column element of 
the Jacobian in (16) may change its sign. The slope of  * ~ ~ u u =  line can be determined via total 
differentiation of (14): 


























































    (17) 
The sign of the slope  * ~ ~ u u =  line is ambiguous since the first two terms in the numerator on the 
right-hand side are positive, whereas the second term is negative. Note that the numerator of 
the third term contains the marginal environmental-damage differential depicted in Figure 1. 
Four cases can be distinguished.  
•  In the first case, the marginal damage is very small such that the change in location of the 
* ~ ~ u u=  line is so small that the qualitative behaviour of the system is the same is in Figure 
2.1. The  * ~ ~ u u = , however, line is steeper than the one depicted in Figure 2.1. 
•  In the second case the marginal damage is so large that the second term in the numerator on 
the left-hand side always dominates the first term. This implies that slope of the  * ~ ~ u u =  line 
changes its sign.  
•  The third case is characterized by highly convex marginal environmental damage, i.e. z 
substantially larger than 1. In this case, the marginal damage differential is small for k close 
to 0.5, but large for k close to 0 or 1. The  * ~ ~ u u=  line is inversely S-shaped 
•  The fourth case is characterized by highly concave marginal environmental damage, i.e. z 
close to 0. In this case, the sum marginal damage differential is large for k close to 0.5, but 
small for k close to 0 or 1. The  * ~ ~ u u =  line is S shaped. 




Since the  * ~ ~ u u =  line is steeper than the one depicted in Figure 2.1, equilibria with incomplete 
agglomeration of households are possible. The underlying reason is that living in an agglomer-
ation is not that beneficial anymore if producers generate environmental pollution. Thus, if all 
people lived in one region, the sum of congestion and pollution effects would dominate the 
agglomeration  effect.  A  fraction  of  the  inhabitants  would  have  an  incentive  to  emigrate, 
thereby mitigating the congestion effect for the non-migrants until inhabitants of both regions 
are equally well off. It turns out that pollution is a centrifugal force. See Elbers/Withagen [5] 
and van Marrewijk [23] for the same conclusion in a similar modelling framework. 
Case 2 
Case 2 is depicted in Figure 2.2. Compared to Figure 2.1,  * ~ ~ u u=  line is rotated in a counter-
clockwise fashion. If the resulting indifference line is rather flat like the one depicted in Figure 
2.2, there will be vertical segments for ß=0 and ß=1. The point of intersection with the w=w* 
line is either a stable node or a stable spiral. This follows from the Jacobian, (16), which now 
has a positive determinant. However, as the Jacobian is a linear approximation of the true 
dynamics which is reasonably accurate only close to the equilibrium, unstable paths farther 
from the equilibrium cannot be excluded. Figure 2.2 shows an example starting from agglom-
eration. Assume that all firms and housholds are located in the East, i.e. ß=k=1. Households 
suffer from pollution and start moving to the West. At ß=0.5, firms start to relocate, too, since 
factor incomes are higher in regions where demand is larger. At some point, all households 
have moved, but firms are still relocating to the West. If the number of firms is getting too 
large, people flee environmental pollution and start relocating to the East again. When ß=0.5 
again, firms start to follow until at some time housholds relocate to the West. There are two 
effects generating this cycle. On the one hand consumers like to live in a clean environment, 
i.e. they want to locate far away from the producers. The producers,on the other hand, like big 
markets and want to locate close to the consumers. Thus, the producers chase the consumers 
and the consumers try to flee. Since there are only two regions in the model, the result is a 
cycle. In the real world, there are, of course, more than two regions, but analogous patterns are  
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observable in the process of de-urbanization. People move from the city to the country side, but 
shopping centres, petrol stations etc follow and tend to disturb the idyll. As a reaction people 





β  1  0 
k 
 
Figure 2.2: Patterns of location for large values of δ : The chase case 
Two  additonal  remarks  shall  be  made  here. As  already  mentioned,  the  dispersion equi-
librium, ß=k=0.5, is locally asymptotically stable. Thus, instead of the chase-and-flee circle, 
the long-run laisser-faire solution of the model might be one in which firms and housholds are 
equally distibuted across the two regions. This is likely if the  * ~ ~ u u =  line is not too flat, i.e. if 
pollution  is  substantial but  not extreme.  The  larger  the  impact  of  pollution,  δ  ,  flatter the 
* ~ ~ u u =  line and the more likely is the chase-and-flee case. The second remark is related to the 
question as to which parameters induce the change from Scenario 1 to Scenario 2. Inspection 
of ion (17) shows that besides δ, which is obvious, the fixed cost, F, is a critical parameter, too. 
F occurs in the last term in the numerator on the right-hand-side of this equation and, thus, has 
the same effect, at least qualitatively as the pollution parameter δ. The reason is that a large 
fixed cost reduces utility derived from consumption. See equations (12) and (12*). Thus, the  
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compensation consumers get in terms of consumer surplus when they locate close to dirty 
producers is small and environmental concerns tend to dominate material wants. 
Case 3  
If z is large, the differential in environmental damage between the East and the West is in-
creased more than proportionally in relation to the number of firms if firms relocate. Close to 
the dispersion equilibrium, the system has the same properties as in Case 1. It is a saddle and, 
thus, unstable. When dß/dk=0 in equation (18), the  * ~ ~ u u =  line bends backwards and additional 
equilibria  with  fully  dispersed  households  and  incomplete  industrial  agglomeration  are 
feasible. See Figure 2.3. The possibility of such an inverse S shape is confirmed by numerical 
simulations (see the diagrams in the Appendix). The partial-agglomeration equilibria are stable 
nodes or spirals and the initial conditions determine which equilibrium is approached. A chase-
and-flee cycle like depicted in Figure 2.2 cannot be excluded, however. For a large degree of 
industrial agglomeration, the marginal and absolute damages in the industrialized region are 
very large such that households living have large incentives to relocate and like in Case 2 
factors tend to follow.  
Case 4  
If z is small, the curve may be S-shaped like the one depicted in Figure 2.4. Close to the 
dispersion equilibrium, the system exhibits the same qualitative behaviour as the one discussed 
in  Case  2.  The  dispersion  equilibrium  is  locally  stable.  Far  from  this  equilibrium, 
agglomeration forces dominate and the properties of the system resemble those of the one 
discussed  in  Case  1.  There  are  two  equilibria  with  dispersed  households  and  partially 
agglomerated  factors  and  they  are  unstable.  Finally,  there  are  two  stable  agglomeration 
equilibria with full agglomeration of the industry in one region and a majority (which may be 
100%) of the households residing in the same region. Thus, depending on historical conditions, 







β  1  0 
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β  1  0 
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Figure 2.4: Patterns of location for small values of z  
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4. Optimal Environmental Policy 
Let W denote welfare. Welfare is the population-weighted sum of utilities in the East and in the 
West,  * ~ ) 1 ( ~ u ß u ß − + . From (12) and (12*), rearranging terms and using (11) and (11*) to 
replace (Θ+ß(1–Θ)) and (1–ß(1–Θ)) , we have 























,      (18) 
with p and p* given by (11) and (11*), respectively 
This is to be maximized with respect to respect to ß and k. The derivatives with respect to k 
and ß are: 
    ( )( )









1 1 δ δ
γ
 ,          (19) 






,                  (20) 
where the wage differential and the indirect-utility differential are determined by eqs. (13) and 
(14), respectively. It is not surprising that the indifference condition  * u ~ u ~ = is the first-order 
condition with respect to household location. Households do not generate externalities (the 
congestion effect being internalized the market). Thus, individual behaviour is compatible with 
welfare maximization. If households do not want to move, i.e. if  * u ~ u ~ = , they have located 
optimally, individually as well as socially, and the social planner's first-order condition is met. 
Firms, in contrast, do cause external effects and, therefore, the planner's first order condition 
with  respect  to  firm  location  differs  from  the  corresponding  private-sector  indifference 
condition.  
The social optimum can be derived from the first-order conditions (19) and (20). Before this 
is done, we look two special cases that are quite simple. 
•  Absence of environmental damage. If δ=0, full agglomeration is optimal. Equations (19) 
and (20) imply that welfare is increasing (decreasing) in ß and k if the corresponding wage 
or utility differential is positive (negative). This implies that the gradient pointing to the  
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maximum corresponds to the arrows depicting the adjustment dynamics in Figure 2.1. The 
agglomeration equilibria are maxima and the symmetric dispersion equilibrium is a saddle.  
•  Dominant environmental damage. The case in which environmental damage is so large that 
it dominates everything else can be considered by letting δ  go to infinity in eq. (18) or by 
setting  the  openness  parameter  to  unity,  Θ =1.  The  only  welfare  and  component  to  be 
affected by location choices then is the environmental-harm term at the end of the right-
hand side of (18), which is always negative. It can be minimized by setting ß=0 and k=1 or 
vice versa, i.e. by perfectly separating households and factors from each other.  
Having discussed the two extreme cases of full concentration and perfect separation, we pro-
ceed by looking at the intermediate case. Matters are more difficult if environmental damages 
are neither negligible nor dominating everything else. Solutions cannot be determined explicit-
ly anymore since the first-order conditions, (19) and (20), are highly nonlinear and, moreover, 
optima are not always interior. Thus, a numerical approach was employed as follows.  
1.  In  a  first  step  select  parameters to  calibrate  the  Dixit-Stiglitz  model.  In  what  follows, 
F=Θ =γ=0.5. Then, choose values z such that the marginal environmental damage is either 
convex or concave. 
2.  In a second step, vary the pollution-impact parameter δ  from zero to infinity (in practice a 
very large value) and determine the corresponding welfare maxima numerically taking into 
account that boundary welfare maxima are feasible.  
3.  Finally,  the  welfare-maximizing  allocations  of  firms  and  households  corresponding  to 
changes in the environmental-impact parameter δ  are depicted in the (ß,k) space.  
The second step of the procedure, which is a bit cumbersome, is described in detail in the 
appendix. In what follows, we present only the final result, obtained from performing step 3. 
Figures 3.1, and 3.2 show results for convex and concave marginal environmental damage 
corresponding to the parameter values z=4 and z=0.2, respectively. The parameter δ  is in-
creased from zero to a large value and the arrows depict the movement of the optimum alloc-
ation of production and habitation as δ increases. Solid lines represent continuous movements  
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of the welfare-maximizing spatial pattern and dotted lines indicate jumps from one maximum 
to another one. The figures are stylized insofar as they depict the qualitative results. In partic-
ular, the solid lines may be bended rather than linear as drawn in the diagrams. The figures 
show that the optimum is full agglomeration if δ =0 and perfect separation if δ  is very large. 
For some intermediate levels of δ , the welfare maximum is attained by dispersion, i.e. by 
ß=k=0.5. Other possible welfare maxima include the possibilities of imperfect agglomeration 
and imperfect separation. In particular, we have the following results:
4 
•  z=4. For small values of δ , there is full agglomeration. As δ  is increased, the optimum 
moves to partial agglomeration and then to total dispersion, i.e. 50% of factors and 50% of 
factor owners locating in the East and the remaining 50% in the West. As δ  is further 
increased beyond a particular critical value, the equilibrium jumps to partial separation: all 
households should be located in one region and the majority of the production in the other 
region. If δ  becomes very large, perfect separation becomes optimal.  
•  z=0.2. Full agglomeration is again optimal for small values of δ. As δ  is increased beyond 
some critical value of δ , a jump occurs and dispersion is the optimum. However, unlike in 
the  above  case,  the  movement  of  the  optimum  from  dispersion  to  perfect  separation  is 
smooth. 
Of course the arrows in Figures 3.1 and 3.2 do not represent dynamics, but comparative statics. 
The important result is that besides full agglomeration and perfect separation almost all other 
geographical patterns can be optimal: partial agglomeration, partial separation, and dispersion.
5 
                                                 
4   The appendix discusses these scenarios in much more detail, including cases in which the first-order 
conditions are not sufficient for a welfare maximum, but rather give rise to a saddle point. 
5    Some spatial patterns can be exluded, for example a partial-agglomeration equilibrium which is 
possible under laisser faire in Scenario 3 (Figure 2.3) and wich is characerized by an equal number 



















Figure 3.2: Effects of increasing δ for z=0.2   
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5. A Note on Instruments of Environmental Policy 
How can the optimum be achieved? For small environmental damages, the policy is laisser 
faire.  If  environmental  damage  matters, however, full agglomeration  is  no  longer  optimal: 
incomplete agglomeration of firms is warranted and for extreme environmental damages even 
perfect separation of firms and residents is desirable. The standard instrument in environmental 
economics to implement the welfare-maximizing allocation is an environmental tax on the 
emission  of  pollutants.  In  our  model,  the  emissions  are  proportional  (and  with  the 
normalizations made in Section 2 even identical) to the use of factors. Thus, one could employ 
factor taxation instead. However, such taxes do not always do the job. The impact of a tax on 
factor utilization in the East is shown in Figure 4. It s seen that the laisser-faire indifference 
locus for producers known from Figure 2.1 is shifted to the right. The disadvantage of the tax 
can only be compensated for by a larger market, i.e. ß>0.5. As partial-agglomeration optima lie 
on the upward-sloping parts of the  * ~ ~ u u=  line (see Figure A.1 in the appendix), the equilibria 
resulting after the introduction of a tax are saddles and, thus, unstable. Although the industry's 
indifference  line  is  moved,  centripetal  forces  continue  to  dominate  the  factor  allocation. 
Factors move to where the consumers are. It is not possible to induce factors to agglomerate 
only partially in a region where consumers agglomerate. The underlying reason is that there are 
no decreasing returns to factor utilization in this model like they are known from standard 
models of international factor movements. See Ruffin [20] for a survey. Factor incomes depend 
only on the size of the product market, but not on the factor supply in a region. Equation (13) 
confirms this.
6 
If taxes do not inhibit industrial concentration in a region, the policy must be command and 
control. The optimum allocation of factors across regions must be enforced by law as economic 
incentives are ineffective. Once the optimum allocation of production has been established, 
consumers choose their locations optimally without further government intervention.  
                                                 
6   In the case of partial separation, matters are different. The  * ~ ~ u u =  schedule is downward-sloping and 
the equilibrium is a stable node or a stable spiral. However, the chase-and-flee dynamics cannot be 











Figure 4: The impact of factor taxation in the East 
 
6 Costly Emission Abatement  
Up to here, the only way of reducing environmental damage was to relocate producers to the 
other region – of course at the expense of increasing emissions there. This section introduces 
proper emission abatement. In the absence of abatement efforts, baseline emissions are k and 
1–k in the East and in the West, respectively. See equation (10). Emissions after abatement 
then are k–a and 1–k–a*, where a and a* denote the abatement levels. Abatement is costly and 
we  model  this  by  an  increase  in  the  fixed  cost.  Think  of  a  large  investment  in  cleaner 
technology  that  renders  production  cleaner  once  and  for  all.  Let  the  abatement  cost  be 
increasing and convex, i.e. F'(a)>0, F"(a)>0.. From (7), (8), and (9) we then have that 
•  the output per firm is increasing in a, 
•  the number of firms is decreasing in a, and 
•  the region's total output (and thus its baseline emissions, too) is unaffected by a change in a. 
The  underlying  logic  is  that  the  increase  in  fixed  cost  makes  large-scale  production  more 
profitable. The number of firms declines. Without the change in abatement, this would result in  
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an overall cost reduction due to increasing returns to scale. This cost saving is, however, eaten 
up by the higher cost of abatement. That the effect on total output (and, thus, on baseline 
emissions as well) is zero, is an artefact of this model. Nevertheless, the following results will 
go through for more complex models of monopolistic completion as well. 
In what follows, we will look at the impact of a change in environmental regulation on the 
patterns economic geography. Let us assume that environmental regulation is of the command-
and-control type and that the Eastern government unilaterally tightens environmental standards 
whereas the West does business as usual, i.e. da>0 and da*=0. With different environmental 
standards in the two regions, the factor-income differential, (13), and the utility differential, 
(14), have to be rewritten such that 
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.   (22) 
Note that p and p* in (22) depend on the abatement levels via (11) and (11'). 
Let us investigate the impact of the parameter change in the (ß,k) diagram by looking at the 
indifference lines, k=k* and  * ~ ~ u u = . Without loss of generality assume that the initial situation 
is  characterized  by  a=a*=0.  Moreover,  we  consider  a  scenario  with  a  relatively  small 
environmental-damage parameter such that the consumers' indifference line still is upward-
sloping.  This  is  like  in  Figure  2.1,  however  with  a  slightly  steeper  * ~ ~ u u =   line.  Totally 
differentiating the left-hand sides of (21) and (22), keeping k constant, we have 
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where the arguments of F and F' have been omitted for notational brevity. From (23), it is clear 
that the (w=w*) indifference line is shifted to the right, the more the  higher the  marginal  
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abatement cost, F'. Since costs are increased by tighter environmental standards and this has a 
negative impact on factor income in the region affected by these standards, factor owners can 
only be indifferent where to locate their factors if the regulated economy is larger than the 
unregulated economy, i.e. if ß>0.5 in our case. As can be seen from (24), there are two effects 
that  shift  the  * ~ ~ u u =   indifference  line.  The  denominator  on  the  right-hand  side  is  always 
negative. The first term in the numerator is positive. This means that material well-being is 
reduced by relatively more for residents in the region with tightened environmental standards. 
Of course, residents in both regions are negatively affected by the higher production cost in the 
East, but those living in the West are to some extent insulated from the adverse effects of 
tighter standards by the transportation cost. The other effect is the environmental-quality effect. 
People living in the region with stricter environmental standards benefit from lower pollution. 
Given that we assumed that a=0 initially, the environmental quality effect is likely to dominate 
unless the marginal abatement cost is prohibitively high. Then,  * ~ ~ u u =  line is shifted to the 
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Figure 5: Effects of tighter environmental standards in the East 
Figure 5 shows a scenario in which F' is small compared to δ such that the environmental-
quality effect dominates the other two effects contained in (23) and (24). The shift of the w=w*  
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line is minuscule compared to the shift of the  * ~ ~ u u =  curve. It is seen that one of the stable 
equilibria, W, indicating agglomeration of firms in the West, vanishes, whereas the Eastern 
equilibrium, E, only changes its location. What does this mean? Stricter standards in the East 
are bad for factors, but good for citizens residing in this region. As the East becomes more 
attractive as a place to live, ecologically sensitive people emigrate from the West and move to 
the East. As firms benefit from the larger market, they relocate as well if the market-size effect 
is stronger than the abatement-cost effect. The result is a catastrophic change in the spatial 
patterns of habitation and production, which occurs if the abatement parameter a is increased 
beyond a certain threshold value. A marginal change in environmental regulation can induce a 
landslide of the spatial organization of the economy.   
 
7 Summary and Conclusions 
This paper has looked at a world in which factors of production and their owners are mobile, 
but in which factor owners do not have to live where their factors are employed. The set-up 
was a two-region Dixit-Stiglitz model with trade costs. Due to the assumption of quasilinear 
preferences the baseline version of the model without environmental externalities unambig-
uously  generates  agglomerations.  The  centripetal  always  dominate  the  centrifugal  forces. 
Environmental externalities induce an additional centrifugal force such that agglomeration tend-
encies are mitigated. However, this only affects mobile households, but not mobile production. 
Thus, if environmental harm is large, a chase-and-flee pattern is possible. People want to live 
in a clean environment and they avoid industrial agglomerations. However, their role as factor 
owners  induces  an  investment  pattern  that  contradicts  their  self-interest  as  consumers  of 
environmental quality. They tend to locate their factors where the demand is, i.e. close to the 
consumers. Since each individual's contribution to the environmental harm is marginal, the 
environmental concern is not taken into account and the industry chases the consumers.  
Optimal spatial patterns in the presence of environmental concerns range from complete 
separation  over  dispersion  to  complete  agglomeration.  Complete  separation  is  optimal  if 
environmental harm is large: no one wants to live near a hot spot and no one should live near a  
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hot spot. It has then been shown that partial-agglomeration optima are sometimes difficult to be 
implemented. As there  are no decreasing returns to industrial concentration, environmental 
taxes can be ineffective when an optimal pattern of production and habitation is strived for. A 
way out is to implement the optimal allocation of factors across regions by command and 
control. Finally, it was shown that the unilateral introduction of environmental standards via 
abatement  requirements  may  induce  catastrophic  changes  in  the  geographical  patterns  of 
habitation and production. 
An interesting feature of this model is that many results depend on the curvature of the 
marginal  environmental  damage  curve.  In  standard  environmental-economics  models,  it  is 
assumed that marginal environmental damage is increasing, but its second derivative does not 
matter. Here it does matter. The underlying reason is that locational decisions involve a com-
parison of environmental damages in the two regions. In other words, locational decisions are 
based not on the absolute level of environmental damage but on its East-West differential. This 
implies  that  third  derivatives  of  the  damage  function  play  a  role  in  situations  where  only 
second derivatives would occur in standard models.  
Some extensions of the model come into mind. Firstly, all pollution was treated as a purely 
local public bad in this paper. Transboundary pollution spillovers were neglected. They can be 
introduced easily  and the results would be quite straightforward. The  pollution differential 
between regions would be mitigated and the chase-and-flee scenario as well as the optimality 
of separation would be more unlikely. A second extension would pertain to the adjustment 
dynamics in the laisser-faire case. Like Krugman [12, Appendix B] and Baldwin [1], one could 
consider forward-looking expectations instead of the static-expectations used in this paper to 
model adjustment processes. The conjecture is that history-vs.-expectations outcomes will be 
possible  if  environmental  damage  is  small.  Whether  the  introduction  of  forward-looking 
expectations could induce more desirable patterns of location in situations in which this paper 
found a chase-and-flee cycle, remains to be investigated. Finally, the case of costly abatement 
deserves deeper analysis, in particular regarding the design of optimal environmental policies 
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Appendix: Derivation of Optimal Solutions 
Optima will be derived via the first order conditions,  0 / = ∂ ∂ ß W , (19), and  0 / = ∂ ∂ k W , (20), and 
they will be depicted in the (ß,k) space. Total differentiation (19 and (20) yields the Hessian,  
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It has negative diagonal elements and the signs of the off-diagonal elements are ambiguous. 
The  sign  of  the  first  diagonal  element  is  obvious  for  δ  >0, the  sign  of  the second  one  is 
determined by 
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and for the off-diagonal elements we have 
    ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
z z k k
ß ß F k
u u





























.  (A3) 
They are negative (positive) if the environmental damage parameter δ  is large (small). The 
elements of the Hessian determine the slopes of the  0 / = ∂ ∂ ß W  and the  0 / = ∂ ∂ k W  curves in the 
(ß,k) space. That the signs of the off-diagonal elements are indeterminate indicates that both 
curves may be positively or negatively sloped, depending on δ, and as will be seen, that they 
can even be non-monotonous. The determinant of the Hessian may be negative and this implies 
that a point in which both first-order conditions are satisfied is not always a maximum. What is 
decisive for the following investigation, however, is that the signs of the diagonal elements are 
negative. Thus, for given values of the one variable, the first-order condition with respect to the 
other variable maximizes the welfare functional. This has the following implications: 
•  In all points in the (ß,k) space located above the  0 / = ∂ ∂ k W  curve, k is too large and should 
be reduced. The opposite applies to points below this locus. 
•  In all points located to the left of the  0 / = ∂ ∂ ß W  curve, ß is too small and should be increased. 
The opposite applies to all points to the right of this locus.  
30 
 
To calibrate the model, we use the following numerical values of the parameters of the 
geography module: 
F = γ = Θ  = 0.5 . 
For the environmental-damage function, we use the values z=4 and z=0.2 to indicate convex 
and convave environmental marginal damages respectively. As regards the δ  parameter of the 
model we start with δ=0 and increase it to very large values. Figures A1 and A2 depict the loci 
of the first-order conditions in the (ß,k) space for z=4 and z=0.2, respectively, and selected 
values of δ . Figures have been drawn using MATHEMATICA
®. ∂W/∂ß=0 is depicted as a 
solid line, ∂W/∂k=0 as a dotted line. For δ =0, the phase diagram is the same as in Figure 2.1: 
the dispersion equilibrium is a saddle and the agglomeration equilibria are the welfare optima. 
With increasing values of δ , the isoclines rotate and change their shapes. It is seen that the 
∂W/∂ß=0 line is rotated in a counter-clockwise fashion whereas the ∂W/∂k=0 line is rotated 
clockwise. Figures A.1 and A.2 reveal the following: 
•  For z=4, we start with agglomeration at small values of δ. As δ  gets larger, the number of 
firms in the agglomeration declines whereas households are still fully agglomerated. For 
even larger values of δ , the  0 / = ∂ ∂ ß W  line has an inverse S shape. The resulting optima 
involve partial-agglomeration. E.g., for δ =3.7, the optimum is characterized by some 90% 
of  the  households  and  60%  of  the  firms  locating  in  the  same  region.  The  partial-
agglomeration  equilibria  converge  to  total  dispersion.  The  dispersion  optimum  remains 
optimal for a large parameter range, e.g. for δ =5.5 and for δ =9.5 as shown in the diagram. 
For even larger values of δ , the two lines converge and intersect, the intersection point 
being a saddle. For very large values of the damage parameter, not shown in the diagram, 
both lines have negative slopes, the ∂W/∂ß=0 line being flatter than the ∂W/∂k=0 line, and 
the optimum is perfect separation with firms and households located in different regions. 
•  For z=0.2, we start with agglomeration at small values of δ again. As δ  gets larger, depicted 
here for δ =0.58, there are multiple intersection points, but the partial-agglomeration points 
are saddles and, therefore, not optimal. At certain critical value of δ , the optimum jumps to 
the centre, i.e. to dispersion, and stays there for some range of parameters, depicted for δ  
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=0.6 and δ =0.7. In the latter case, the S shape of the  0 / = ∂ ∂ ß W  line becomes obvious. With 
further increases in the damage parameter we move to partial separation, e.g. some 80% of 
the households and some 20% of the industry locating in the same region for δ =0.7, and 












































































































Figure A2 The first-order conditions for z=0.2 